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Abstract
The background of Stevenson's story is viewed as a stylized model of participation in a nancial
pyramid. You are invited to participate in a dubious activity. If you refuse, you neither gain nor
lose anything. If you accept, you will gain if you are able to nd somebody who will take your
place on exactly the same conditions, but suer a loss otherwise. The catch is that there is a nite
number of discrete steps at which the substitution can be done, so the agent who joins in at the last
step inevitably loses. Clearly, rational agents will not agree to participate at any step. However,
an arbitrarily small probability of a \bailout," in which case that last agent will get the same gain
as every other participant, plus an appropriately asymmetric structure of private information,
change everything, so the proposal will be accepted in a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, provided
there are suciently many steps ahead.
JEL Classication Numbers: D 82; C 72. MSC2010 Classications: 91B44; 91A18; 91A26.
Key words: nancial pyramid; partitional information structure; game of incomplete informa-
tion; game of perfect information.
1 Introduction
Asset booms and crashes are a persistent feature of economic life (Chancellor, 1999). Naturally,
economists have spent considerable time and eort trying to reconcile such phenomena with the
tenets of general economic equilibrium (e.g., Tirole, 1982; Boldrin and Levine, 2001; Abreu and
Brunnermeier 2003; Kocherlakota, 2008; Leoni, 2009; Barlevy, 2014; Miao, 2014).
This paper is only remotely connected with that strand of literature. First, we have in mind
articial booms and crashes that result from deliberate actions by market manipulators. In real life,
it need not be clear to economic agents whether they face a \natural" boom or an \articial" one
(Schiller, 2000), but here we assume that it is clear.
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Second, we only consider the decision making of \rank and le" participants, not the activity of
those manipulators themselves, nor conditions favorable or otherwise to them. To be more precise,
we analyze the rationality of this attitude: \I know this house of cards will crumble eventually, but
I'll be out of it by then." To be even more precise, we try to substantiate the intuitively plausible
notion that the more distant in time the expected collapse is perceived to be, the more justied
is that attitude. As a stylized model of the nancial pyramid itself, we employ the background of
Stevenson's (1891) story.
Section 2 contains a general description of our model. The exact technical details are given, and
our main theorem formulated, in Section 3. The proofs are in Section 4. A discussion of various
related questions in Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Informal Model
For those readers unfamiliar with Stevenson's story, there is no spoiler in the following. Only the
general background is invoked explicitly.
A magic bottle (or rather an imp inside the bottle) fullls any desire of its owner; however, that
owner is sure to go to hell upon death. The only way to get rid of the bottle is to sell it to somebody
else, for \coined money" and at a loss for oneself. Naturally, the imp will not grant eternal life, nor
allow any modication of the terms on which the bottle may be transferred.
When the bottle appears in the story for the rst time, its owner at that moment suggests the
following strategy to a prospective buyer:
All you have to do is to use the power of the imp in moderation, and then sell it to
someone else, as I do to you, and nish your life in comfort.
The problem with this strategy becomes obvious when the price of the bottle approaches zero.
However, while it is high enough, willing participants are not hard to nd in the story. (Stevenson's
story has already been discussed in philosophical literature (Sharvy, 1983; Sorensen, 1986) as a
paradox. The dierence of the language makes direct comparisons with this paper dicult.)
We replace \every wish" and eternal perdition, which are hard to formalize anyway, with gains
and losses, thus obtaining a stylized model of participation in a nancial pyramid. Instead of irregular
downward movement of the price of the bottle, we assume that costless transfers of the bottle can be
executed at discrete time moments and the number of possible future transfers is commonly known
beforehand.
The question: Is it possible to justify the view that the more steps are ahead, the easier it is to
accept the bottle, in the framework of common knowledge of rationality of all agents involved?
The interaction between the agents is modeled as a nite extensive game. Each move belongs
to one of two categories: either a proposal by the current owner to somebody else, or a decision of
an agent proposed to whether to take the bottle. The rst proposal to take the bottle comes from
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outside, from the Devil. The total number of steps, T , is xed beforehand. An agent who never held
the bottle gains nothing and loses nothing. An agent who took the bottle at some stage gains G if
he is able to nd a replacement, or suers loss L otherwise. A detailed technical description is given
in the next section.
Our basic question may be formulated, now, in this way: May the existence of an equilibrium
where the bottle actually changes hands depend on the number of steps available?
Straightforward argument backwards shows that such an equilibrium cannot exist for any T . One
does not even have to restrict attention to, say, subgame perfect equilibria. For our purposes, this
negative answer is disappointing to say the least.
The situation will change drastically if we assume that a \bailout" (or an \amnesty") may happen
with a (small) probability p > 0, in which case the agent left with the bottle at the end obtains the
same gain as those who escaped in time.
Although all agents are basically the same, there may be asymmetry in their information. We
use the simplest model of knowledge, a partitional information structure (Aumann, 1976; Bacharach,
1985): there is a set of the \states of the world," a probability distribution on the set, and mappings
determining signals about the actual state the agents receive. This model is common knowledge
among the agents, only the signals received are private. Thus, every state of the world determines
whether the \bailout" will happen, and what each agent knows about that, as well as about the
knowledge of other agents.
We assume that all proposals and decisions to accept or reject are publicly observed. In a sense,
we thus have a game of perfect, but incomplete, information.
The gains and losses are measured in a von Neumann{Morgenstern utility rather than money.
An important characteristic of our game is  := L=(L+G): For an agent to agree to take the bottle
at an equilibrium, he must evaluate the probability of safe escape as, at least, . Generally, that
probability depends on the preceding moves in the game and on the agent's private information. It
is not commonly known. Thus, our situation is not related to the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and
Stokey (1982) (see also Neeman, 1996).
3 Formal Model
A BI game is characterized by the following data:

N;T;
;; P;
Amn; hiii2N ; G; L

;
where N is a nite set (of players); T is an integer (number of steps), 
 is an arbitrary set (of \states
of the world");  is a -algebra of subsets of 
 (\events"), including ; and 
 itself; P is a probability
measure on ; 
Amn 2  consists of the states of the world at which the \bailout" happens; each
i is a mapping i : 
 ! Si (private signals); G and L are strictly positive real numbers. If Si is
nite, we assume that each  1i (si)  
 belongs to ; otherwise a -algebra of subsets of Si should
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be dened and the mapping i should be measurable. The complete description of how such a game
is played takes some time.
A history is a nite string of the kind hi1; 1; i2; 2; : : : ; imi or hi1; 1; i2; 2; : : : ; im; mi, where
1  m  T , ik 2 N and k 2 fYes, Nog for all relevant k. Each ik denotes the player addressed with
a proposal to take the bottle at stage k; k denotes his decision. There is a natural partial order
on the set H of all possible histories, h0  h meaning that h coincides with an initial segment of h0.
Given h 2 H, we denote H!(h) the set of immediate successors of h: H!(h) := fh0 2 H j h0 > h &
@h00 2 H [h0 > h00 > h]g. When the empty string, \zero history," h0 := hi is added to H, the latter
becomes a tree.
H is naturally partitioned into H ! and H?. The rst subset consists of h 2 H ending with
k 2 fYes, Nog, so a new proposal is in order (unless m = T ); the second, of h 2 H ending with
ik 2 N , so an answer is expected. Note that H!(h)  H? whenever h 2 H !, while H!(h)  H !
whenever h 2 H?.
Remark. Our denition allows the current owner to propose to himself, in which case the answer,
Yes or No, does not matter. Although there is no reason for a player to waste time in such a manner,
there is no necessity to prohibit such decisions in the rules of the game either. Actually, the possibility
to retain the bottle allows a simpler description of equilibrium strategies in Section 4.2. Similarly,
the rules allow a player who has already held the bottle and passed it to another player to take it
again later, even though the second taking can only result in a loss.
We denote H the set of complete histories, i.e., h 2 H ! such that m = T . Given a player i 2 N ,
the set H is partitioned into three subsets: H i0,
H i+ and H
i , according as player i never held the
bottle, held it and then passed it to somebody else, or is left with the bottle at the end. Technically,
h 2 H i0 if each occurrence of i in h is followed by No (in particular, if h does not include i at all);
h 2 H i+ if h contains a fragment hi;Yesi and the last such fragment is followed by hj;Yesi with j 6= i;
h 2 H i  if h contains a fragment hi;Yesi and Yes does not occur in h after the last such fragment.
Given a player i 2 N , a complete history h 2 H, and ! 2 
, we dene \local" NM utilities
ui(h; !) in the following way:
ui(h; !) :=
8>>>><>>>>:
0; h 2 H i0;
G; h 2 H i+;
G; h 2 H i  & ! 2 
Amn;
 L; h 2 H i  & ! =2 
Amn:
(1)
To the set of players, we add a \quasi-player," the Devil, who is denoted 0 (assuming 0 =2 N). We
denote N := N [f0g. The Devil's objective { to get the players to take the bottle { can be expressed
with this local utility function (independent of ! 2 
):
u0(h) :=
(
0; 8i 2 N [h 2 H i0];
G; otherwise:
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The setHn H can also be partitioned into subsetsHi, i 2 N , according as who is to make a decision
after that history; the straightforward technical denition is omitted. A strategy xi of player i 2 N
is a mapping Hi  Si ! H such that xi(h; i()) : 
 ! H is -measurable, and xi(h; si) 2 H!(h)
for each h 2 Hi and all si 2 Si. The Devil's strategy is hi1; i2; : : : ; iT i: at the rst step, the bottle is
oered to player i1; if refused, at the second step it is oered to i2, etc. If the bottle is accepted at
some stage, the Devil takes no part in the further play.
Once a total strategy prole x N 2 X N :=
Q
i2 N Xi and a history h 2 H are given, a complete
history x N (h; !) 2 H is dened by an obvious recursion for every ! 2 
 { what happens if each
player uses strategy xi starting from h and the state of the world is !. Given x N 2 X N , i 2 N ,
h 2 H, and { 2 f0; ;+g, we dene p{i (x N j h) := P (f! 2 
 j x N (h; !) 2 H i{(x N )g) and pi (x N j
h) := P (f! 2 
Amn j x N (h; !) 2 H i (x N )g).
Now the NM utility function Ui : X N ! R of each player i 2 N is the expected value of ui(h; !):
Ui(x N ) := EP [ui(x N (h
0; !); !)] = p+i (x N j h0) G  p i (x N j h0)  L+ pi (x N j h0)  (L+G): (2)
The Devil's utility function U0 : X N ! R is written in this way:
U0(x N ) := EP [u0(x N (h
0; !))] =
 
1  P (f! 2 
 j x N (h0; !) 2
\
i2N
H i0g)
 G: (3)
Naturally, a total strategy prole x0N 2 X N is a Nash equilibrium if
Ui(x
0
N )  Ui(xi; x0Nnfig) (4)
for all i 2 N and xi 2 Xi.
The notion of a Nash equilibrium in extensive games is often viewed as too lax: if a combination
(h; si) has probability 0, then condition (4) does not prohibit any choice of xi(h; si). Typically, the at-
tention is concentrated on perfect Bayesian equilibria, where the decisions in impossible situations are
optimal with respect to a consistent system of beliefs. Here, we can impose even stricter restrictions,
demanding optimality with respect to a family of explicitly dened beliefs.
The exact formulation requires quite a lot of notations, so we start with a general outline. First
of all, our denition of perfectness only applies when each Si is nite and P (
 1
i (si)) > 0 for each
si 2 Si (the last assumption does not restrict generality). Second, no player ever doubts the signal si
received: if an observed history h is incompatible with x N and si, then the inference is that somebody
has deviated from the prescribed strategy xj . We consider three variants of Bayesian update in such
situations. In the rst version, the player assumes that a mistake could have been made by any player
at any previous position, so all the choices made before are ignored, and prior beliefs are conditioned
only on the signal si. In the second version, the player nds a preceding history h
 which is closest
to h among those consistent with si, and conditions prior beliefs on h
 and si. In the third version,
the player nds a preceding history h which is closest to h0 among those histories from which h
is reached with a strictly positive probability (conditioned on si), and then makes a usual Bayesian
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update of prior beliefs viewing h as the initial position. Clearly, h0  h > h  h whenever (h; si)
has zero prior probability, while h = h and h = h0 whenever (h; si) has a strictly positive prior
probability. Our notion of perfectness requires that the choice at an impossible combination (h; si)
should be optimal w.r.t. all the three variants of updating.
Given x N 2 X N and h; h0 2 H, we introduce the notation 	(x N ; h; h0) := f! 2 
 j h0  x N (!; h)g
and (h0 j (x N ; h)) := P (	(x N ; h; h0)). In words, (h0 j (x N ; h)) is the probability of h0 in the event
that the players start at h using strategies x N ; clearly, (h
0 j (x N ; h)) > 0 is only possible when
h0  h. We also denote H(x N ) := fh 2 H j (h j (x N ; h0)) > 0g, the set of histories that have strictly
positive prior probability under x N . If h 2 H(x N ), then the conditional distribution P ( j (x N ; h)) on
 is well-dened, viz., for every A 2 ,
P (A j (x N ; h)) := P (A \	(x N ; h0; h))=(h j (x N ; h0)):
Whenever x N 2 X N , h 2 H(x N ), and h0 2 H!(h), there hold h0 2 H(x N ) () (h0 j (x N ; h)) > 0
and
P (A j (x N ; h)) =
X
h02H!(h)\H(x N )
(h0 j (x N ; h))P (A j (x N ; h0)) (5)
for every A 2 . It is important to note that 	(x N ; h0; h) depends exclusively on the restriction of
x N to h
0 < h; hence the same holds for P ( j (x N ; h)).
Let i 2 N and let Si be nite; without restricting generality, we may assume P ( 1i (si)) > 0 for
each si 2 Si. Given x N 2 X N , we denote Hi(x N ) := f(h; si) 2 HSi j P (	(x N ; h0; h)\ 1i (si)) > 0g;
for each (h; si) 2 Hi(x N ), we dene a conditional probability distribution on :
Pi(A j (x N ; h; si)) := P (A \	(x N ; h0; h) \  1i (si))=P (	(x N ; h0; h) \  1i (si))
for every A 2 .
Given a history h 2 H and a probability distribution ~P on , a subgame  (h; ~P ) is a strategic
game with the same players and strategies xi (i 2 N) restricted to fh0 2 Hi j h0  hg  Si. Similarly
to (2), the NM utility function ~Ui : ~X N ! R of each player i 2 N in the subgame is the expected value
of the local utility ui(h; !) dened by (1), ~Ui(~x N ) := E ~P [ui(~x N (h; !); !)]. If the Devil has already got
rid of the bottle, he does not participate in the subgame; otherwise, his strategy is a list of ik 2 N of
the appropriate length. His utility is also dened as the expected value of the local utility u0(h; !),
under ~P rather than P .
Proposition 3.1. Let x0N be a Nash equilibrium. If h 2 H(x0N ), then, for each i 2 N , x0i satises
(4) in the subgame  (h0; P ( j (x N ; h))); whereas the restriction of x0i to h0  h satises (4) in the
subgame  (h; P ( j (x N ; h))). If Si (for an i 2 N) is nite and (h; si) 2 Hi(x0N ), then x0i satises
(4) in the subgame  (h0; P ( j (x N ; h; si))); whereas the restriction of x0i to h0  h satises (4) in the
subgame  (h; P ( j (x N ; h; si))).
A straightforward proof is omitted.
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The following denitions are only given for BI games where all sets Si are nite and P (
 1
i (si)) > 0
for each si 2 Si. Given x N 2 X N , h 2 H, i 2 N , and si 2 Si, we set h := maxfh0 2 H j h0  h &
P (	(x N ; h
0; h0) \  1i (si)) > 0g and h := minfh0 2 H j P (	(x N ; h0; h) \  1i (si)) > 0g. Then we
dene two auxiliary probability distributions:
P i (A j (x N ; h; si)) := P (A \	(x N ; h0; h) \  1i (si))=P (	(x N ; h0; h) \  1i (si));
P i(A j (x N ; h; si)) := P (A \	(x N ; h; h) \  1i (si))=P (	(x N ; h; h) \  1i (si))
for every A 2 . It is worth noting that P i ( j (x N ; h; si)) = P i( j (x N ; h; si)) = Pi( j (x N ; h; si))
whenever (h; si) 2 Hi(x N ). We set  := f(0; ; ) 2 [0; 1]3 j 0 +  +  = 1g. Given  =
(0; ; ) 2 , we denote P i ( j (x N ; h; si)) = 0P () + P i ( j (x N ; h; si)) + P i( j (x N ; h; si)).
Now we call x0N 2 X N a perfect equilibrium if, for each h 2 H, i 2 N and si 2 Si, and every
 2 , the restriction of x0i to h0  h satises (4) in the subgame  (h; P i ( j (x N ; h; si))).
Applying this condition to h = h0, and each i 2 N and si 2 Si, we see that every perfect
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium indeed.
Remark. The optimality with respect to P i for every  2  is obviously equivalent to the optimality
with respect to each of P , P i , and P
i. The probabilities P i( j (x N ; h; si)) describe a consistent system
of beliefs; therefore, every perfect equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Theorem. Given T , p, and , these statements are equivalent:
p  T ; (6a)
there is a BI game in which the number of steps is T , L=(L+G) = ; P (
Amn)  p;
each Si is nite, and which possesses a perfect equilibrium such that
the Devil's proposal is accepted at the rst stage in every state of the world; (6b)
there is a BI game in which the number of steps is T , L=(L+G) = ;
P (
Amn)  p; and which possesses a Nash equilibrium such that
the Devil's proposal is accepted at some stage in almost every state of the world. (6c)
The implication (6b)) (6c) is obvious. The implications (6c)) (6a) and (6a)) (6b) are proved
in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, respectively.
In a sense, this theorem answers our question: however small p > 0 is, an equilibrium where the
bottle actually changes hands may exist if T is large enough. If T is too small, such an equilibrium
becomes just impossible.
It must be stressed that only the existence of a suitable model is asserted in the theorem. There
is no attempt to describe what may happen in an arbitrary BI game. For instance, if the agents'
information is symmetric, then an equilibrium where the bottle changes hands at (almost) every state
of the world is only possible if P (
Amn)  .
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4 Proof
4.1 Necessity
We x a BI game and a Nash equilibrium x N such that the Devil's proposal is accepted at some stage
in almost every state of the world. For every history h 2 H, we denote 
(h) the set of ! 2 
 such
that the bottle changes hands (at least once) after h under x N . Our assumption about x N means that
P (
(h0)) = 1. Roughly speaking, P (
(h) [ 
Amn j (x N ; h)) for h 2 H(x N ) is the prior probability
that the owner of the bottle at h will get away with it eventually; note, however, that those ! 2 

where that owner takes the bottle again later are included in 
(h) regardless of the nal outcome.
For every history h 2 H, we dene l(h) as the maximal number of changes of the ownership of
the bottle that can happen after h. To be more precise, l(h) := T  m if h = hi1; 1; : : : ; im; mi 2 H !,
whereas l(h) := T  m+ 1 if h = hi1; 1; : : : ; imi 2 H?.
Lemma 4.1. For every history h 2 H(x N ), there holds
P (
Amn j (x N ; h))  P (
(h) [ 
Amn j (x N ; h))  l(h): (7)
Proof. We go by (backward) induction along the game tree.
Step 4.1.1. The inequality (7) holds when h 2 H.
Proof. If h 2 H, then l(h) = 0 and 
(h) = ;; hence (7) holds as an equality.
Although all penultimate histories belong to H?, it is more convenient to start with h 2 H !.
Step 4.1.2. Let h 2 H ! \ H(x N ), and let inequality (7) hold for all h0 2 H!(h) \ H(x N ). Then (7)
holds for h too.
Proof. First, we notice that H!(h) consists of strings hh; ii for i 2 N , l(h0) = l(h) for every h0 2
H!(h), and 
(h) is partitioned into 
(h0) for h0 2 H!(h). Applying (5) rst to A = 
Amn and
then to A = 
(h) [ 
Amn, and invoking the induction hypothesis, we obtain
P (
Amn j (x N ; h)) =
X
h02H!(h)\H(x N )
(h0 j (x N ; h))  P (
Amn j (x N ; h0)) X
h02H!(h)\H(x N )
(h0 j (x N ; h)) P (
(h0)[
Amn j (x N ; h0)) l(h) = P (
(h)[
Amn j (x N ; h)) l(h);
which is the inequality (7).
Step 4.1.3. Let h 2 H? \H(x N ), and let inequality (7) hold for all h0 2 H!(h) \H(x N ). Then (7)
holds for h too.
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Proof. First, we notice that H!(h) consists of strings hh;Yesi and hh;Noi, and that l(h0) = l(h)  1
for both h0 2 H!(h). If the last proposal in h is addressed to the current owner, i.e., that owner
decided to keep the bottle for the time being, then, similarly to the proof of Step 4.1.2, 
(h) is
partitioned into 
(h0) for h0 2 H!(h) and hence (7) follows from the induction hypothesis in the
same way.
Otherwise, i.e., when the current owner j asks another player i to take the bottle, 
(h) =
	(hh;Yesi j (x N ; h)) [
(hh;Noi). If (hh;Yesi j (x N ; h)) = 0, then we argue in essentially the same
way as in the previous paragraph.
Assuming (hh;Yesi j (x N ; h)) > 0, we start with this auxiliary optimization problem, where q
and  are constants from the closed interval [0; 1] and sY; sN; pY; pN; qY; qN are controlled variables,
also from [0; 1]:
sYpY + sNpN ) min (8)
subject to:
sY + sNqN = q; (9a)
qY  ; (9b)
pY  qYl(h) 1; (9c)
pN  qNl(h) 1; (9d)
sY + sN = 1: (9e)
This is a rather cumbersome, non-linear problem; however, it is not so dicult to unravel. First,
we produce a feasible choice: sY = q, sN = 1  q, pY = l(h), qY = , and pN = qN = 0. The value of
the left-hand side in (8) is then sYpY = q
l(h). Let us show that this is, actually, the minimum.
Since all variables are non-negative, there would be no point in strict inequalities in (9b), (9c)
and (9d). Therefore, we can assume pY = 
l(h) and pN = qN
l(h) 1. Re-arranging (9a), we obtain
qN = (q  sY)=sN; hence pN = (q  sY)l(h) 1=sN. Substituting this into (8), we re-write the function
to be minimized as sY( 1)l(h) 1+ql(h) 1. In other words, it decreases in sY when all restrictions
are taken into account. Since sY  q by (9a), we must have sY = q, i.e., the above choice is, indeed,
optimal.
Now we return to the assumptions of Step 4.1.3, denoting q := P (
(h) [
Amn j (x N ; h)), sY :=
(hh;Yesi j (x N ; h)), sN := (hh;Noi j (x N ; h)), pY := P (
Amn j (x N ; hh;Yesi)), pN := P (
Amn j
(x N ; hh;Noi)), qY := P (
(hh;Yesi) [ 
Amn j (x N ; hh;Yesi)), and qN := P (
(hh;Noi) [ 
Amn j
(x N ; hh;Noi)). If sN = 0, then P ( j (x N ; hh;Noi)) is not well-dened; we set pN := qN := 0 in this
case. It is easy to see now that all conditions (9) are satised.
Only (9b) may deserve attention. Let us denote Si := fsi 2 Si j P (
(hh;Yesi) [ 
Amn j
(x N ; hh;Yesi & i = si)) < g. Supposing, to the contrary, that qY < , we immediately obtain
P ( 1i (S

i ) j (x N ; h)) > 0. Since 
(hh;Yesi) [ 
Amn  f! 2 	(x N ; hh;Yesi) j ui(x N (!); !) = Gg,
redening xi(h
0; si) := No for all si 2 Si and h0  h, player i would increase his utility, which
contradicts the assumption that x N is a Nash equilibrium.
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Since the left-hand side of (8) is P (
Amn j (x N ; h)), we obtain (7).
These three steps prove (7) for all h 2 H.
Finally, (7) for h = h0 combined with the assumption P (
(h0)) = 1 gives us (6a).
4.2 Suciency
Let G;L 2 R++, p 2 [0; 1] and T 2 N be such that p  T . We have to produce a BI game with these
parameters and a perfect equilibrium in the game such that the Devil's proposal is accepted at once
in every state of the world.
We set N := f1; : : : ; Tg, 
 := N [ f0g, P (0) := T , and P (i) := (1   )  T i for every i 2 N ;

Amn := f0g, so P (
Amn)  p; for every i 2 N , Si := fYes;Nog, i(!) := Yes if !  i and
i(!) := No otherwise.
To dene the equilibrium strategies, we need auxiliary notation. Given h 2 H n H, we dene
N(h) as the set of i 2 N who held the bottle before, or holds at, h, and N!(h) := fi 2 N j
f1; : : : ; ig \N(h) = ;g. Note that N nN(h) 6= ; since the total number of steps is T = #N , whereas
N!(h) may well be empty.
Now, the Devil's strategy is x00 := hT; T   1; : : : ; 1i. Given i 2 N , h 2 Hi, and si 2 Si, if h 2 H?,
then
x0i (h; si) :=
8>>>><>>>>:
hh;Noi; si = No;
hh;Noi; i =2 N!(h);
hh;Noi; l(h) < i;
hh;Yesi; otherwise;
(10)
if h 2 H !, then
x0i (h; si) :=
(
hh;minfmaxN!(h); l(h)gi; N!(h) 6= ;;
hh; ii; otherwise: (11)
Suppose all players follow the strategies dened in (10) and (11). Since player T receives no
private signal (technically, T (!) = Yes for all ! 2 
), he accepts the Devil's proposal at the rst
step. If ! = 0, i.e., there is the bailout, the bottle goes through all players and ends with player 1;
everybody gets the gain G. If ! = k > 0, then there is no bailout, while the bottle reaches player k
and gets rejected by each player i < k, who knows that no bailout is forthcoming. The player k gets
 L; each player i > k gets G; each player i < k gets 0. Thus, each player's expected utility is 0.
It is convenient to start checking the equilibrium conditions with (11). Let player i hold the bottle
at h. It is clear from (10) that player j would take the bottle from player i only if j  l(h), j 2 N!(h)
(hence j < i), and sj = Yes. Thus, if N
!(h) = ; or si = No (hence sj = No for all j < i), then player
i is stuck with the bottle and his actions do not matter. Otherwise, the probability that sj = Yes
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strictly increases in j, so the maximum in the rst line of (11) denes the best choice for player i
indeed. (The last statement is equally valid for P , P i , or P
i.)
Let us turn to (10). If si = No, then there will be no bailout, and each player j < i knows there
will be no bailout and would not take the bottle from player i. If i 2 N(h), then player i cannot gain
anything by taking the bottle again. If i  1 =2 N!(h) or i > l(h), then player i  1 would never take
the bottle, while the probability that any other player would take it is strictly less than  (again,
regardless of whether the probability is assessed under P , P i , or P
i). In each of those cases, the only
decision for player i compatible with (4) is to reject. Finally, if the last line of (10) is applicable, then
the probability of si 1 = Yes for i > 1, or of the bailout for i = 1, is just , so the decision to take
the bottle is compatible with the equilibrium condition (4) for player i.
5 Concluding remarks
5.1. An alternative interpretation of the \amnesty" may be the appearance of a poorly informed, or
reckless, outsider who does not take into account the possibility of a loss. (Spoiler alert.) Readers
familiar with the story will note that what happens there is not inconsistent with this interpretation.
The game model should be modied in this case, as the \sucker" may emerge at any moment, not
necessarily at the end. On the other hand, if we are interested in the maximal eect a given probability
of the \amnesty" may produce (as in the theorem above), then the \sucker" must come at the end.
5.2. Since the Devil receives no private signal, P describes his beliefs. In the game dened in
Section 4.2, P also describes beliefs of player T .
5.3. There is a drawback to the equilibrium dened in Section 4.2: strategies \always reject" also
form a perfect equilibrium in the model and each player gets the same expected utility. If (6a) holds
as an equality, then, apparently, nothing could be done about that. Otherwise, we can slightly modify
the probabilities in the same model so that \always reject" is no longer a perfect equilibrium, and
the equilibrium x0N gives each player a strictly positive expected utility. To be more precise, we may
pick  > 1 such that p  ()T , and set P (0) := ()T and P (i) := (1  )  ()T i for every i 2 N ;
now the conditional expected utility of player i 2 N is 0 if si = No and (   1)L > 0 if si = Yes.
5.4. There is some vague similarity with the bubble game of Moinas and Pouget (2013), as well as the
absent-minded centipede of Dulleck and Oechssler (1997), but it is rather supercial. In our model
there is no doubt among the agents about the nature of the underlying process; it is only small hope
that a savior will come at the last moment that may keep it going.
5.5. There was no word on mixed strategies so far. Actually, they are already covered by our basic
model: player i can employ a mixed strategy if his signal i includes component(s) independent of
everything else. Thus, our theorem shows that the use of mixed strategies could not extend the set
of (p; ; T ) for which an equilibrium is possible; when an equilibrium is possible, mixed strategies are
not needed.
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